We present communication efficient secure protocols for a variety of linear algebra problems. Our main building block is a protocol for computing Gaussian elimination on encrypted data. As input for this protocol, Bob holds a k × k matrix M , encrypted with Alice's key. At the end of the protocol run, Bob holds an encryption of an upper-triangular matrix M such that the number of nonzero elements on the diagonal equals the rank of M . The communication complexity of our protocol is roughly O(k 2 ). We show that oblivious Gaussian elimination is a powerful primitive. In particular, it allows us to securely decide the intersection of linear and affine subspaces, pick a random vector from the intersection, and obliviously solve a set of linear equations. Our protocols match known insecure communication complexity lower bounds, and improve the communication complexity of both Yao's garbled circuits and that of specific previously published protocols.
Introduction 2 preliminaries
Notation. Let F be a finite field. We denote by v a row vector in the vector space F k where k > 0 and 0 denotes the row vector whose entries are all zero. For a matrix M with entries from F , we denote by M i the ith row of M . For an encryption scheme, we let λ be its security parameter. W.l.o.g, we assume that the result of encrypting a field element is of length O(λ). We use neg(k) to denote a function that is negligible in k, i.e. neg(k) = k −ω (1) .
Homomorphic encryption schemes Our constructions use semantically-secure public-key encryption schemes that allow for simple computations on encrypted data. In particular, we use encryption schemes where the following operations can be performed without knowledge of the private key: (i) Given two encryptions Enc(m 1 ) and Enc(m 2 ), we can efficiently compute Enc(m 1 + m 2 ); and (ii) Given an encryption Enc(m) and c ∈ F , we can efficiently compute Enc(cm).
Several constructions of homomorphic encryption schemes are known, each with its particular properties (see e.g. [14, 10, 8, 13, 15, 12, 7, 1] ). These have been in use in a variety of cryptographic protocols. Over F = GF (2), the encryption scheme of Goldwasser and Micali [10] , based on quadratic residuosity, is sufficient for our constructions.
For a vector v ∈ F n , we denote by Enc( v) the coordinate-wise encryption of v. That is, if v = a 1 , . . . , a n where a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ F , then Enc( v) = Enc(a 1 ), . . . , Enc(a n ) . Similarly, for a matrix M ∈ F m×n , we denote by Enc(M ) the m × n matrix such that Enc(M )[i, j] = Enc(M [i, j] ). An immediate consequence of the above properties of homomorphic encryption schemes is the ability to perform the following operations without knowledge of the secret key: (i) Given encryptions of two vectors Enc( v 1 ) and Enc( v 2 ), we can efficiently compute Enc( v 1 + v 2 ), and similarly with matrices. (ii) Given an encryption of a vector Enc( v) and a constant c ∈ F , we can efficiently compute Enc(c v). (iii) Given an encryption of a matrix Enc(M ) and a matrix M of the appropriate dimensions, we can efficiently compute Enc(M M ) and Enc(M M ).
Adversary model Our protocols are constructed for the two-party semi-honest adversary model. Roughly speaking, both parties are assumed to act in accordance with their prescribed actions in the protocol. Each party may, however, collect any information he/she encounters during the protocol run, and try to gain some information about the other party's input.
Remark 2.1 Our protocols achieve information theoretic security for Bob while Alice's security relies on that of the underlying encryption scheme.
Basic Building Blocks
In our protocols Bob holds data encrypted by a public key homomorphic encryption scheme, while Alice holds the private decryption key. Bob uses Alice's help to perform different calculations, without enclosing his data to her. As a simple example of a protocol where Bob uses Alice's help, assume Bob holds Enc(a) and Enc(b) and needs to compute Enc(ab). Let Multiply be the following (folklore) solution: (i) Bob chooses random masks r a , r b ∈ R F and sends Enc(a + r a ) and Enc(b + r b ) to Alice; (ii) Alice deciphers these messages and returns 
Linear Subspace Intersection
Let F be a finite field and k be a positive integer. Alice holds a subspace
Alice and Bob wish to securely study different properties of V I .
The first variant of the problem is of computing the subspace V I itself. The second is to decide whether V I is the trivial zero subspace. Ignoring security issues, computing the intersection of the input subspaces is at least as hard as deciding whether they have a non trivial intersection. However, in the first problem the players gain a lot of information from the output of the function, and thus constructing a secure protocol may be somewhat easier than in the second variant.
A common step in solving both variants is the following reduction of computing V I into solving a homogeneous linear system. Let V ⊥ B be the perpendicular subspace 3 
Computing the Intersection

Alice decrypts M and computes the subspace
K = ker(M T ), that is, K = v : vM = 0 .
Alice computes the subspace
Correctness and Security. The correctness of the Intersection Computation protocol derives 4 from Claim 3.1. Alice's security immediately follows from the fact she only sends information encrypted in a semantically-secure encryption scheme. To prove Bob's security, we show a simulator for Alice's view. The simulator and its related security proof appear in Appendix B. The following theorem summarizes the properties of our protocol for solving the Oblivious Gaussian Elimination Problem. The protocol is described in Section 4. Having a secure protocol for solving above problem, deciding the intersection of the input subspaces is done in two steps. A procedure for deciding the intersection with one sided constant error probability is depicted in Protocol Intersection Decision in Appendix D. To get a protocol with negligible error probability, Alice and Bob run protocol Intersection Decision for m = ω(log k) times. Alice and Bob then obliviously compute the logical OR of all the executions. The correctness of the protocol is straight forward assuming the correctness of Oblivious Gaussian Elimination.
Deciding Whether the Intersection is Trivial
Theorem 3.4 Protocol Intersection Decision is a secure protocol for the subspace intersection decision problem. The communication complexity of the protocol isÕ(λk a k) and the round complexity is
O(k 0.275 a ).
Oblivious Gauss Elimination
In this section we introduce a protocol for the Oblivious Gaussian Elimination problem (See Definition 3.2), with parameters matching Theorem 3.3. We first define the Oblivious Gaussian Elimination problem for square matrices. Then we design a protocol for this special case, and finally we reduce the problem on general matrices to the problem on their square counterparts. There are two differences between this definition and Definition 3.2. Here, the diagonal of the resulting matrix M does reflect the exact rank of M , but rather only whether M is full rank or not. On the other hand, here we require very high success probability, while in Definition 3.2, only constant success probability is needed.
Gaussian Elimination
The Gaussian elimination algorithm is a well known method for transforming a matrix into a triangular form, while keeping its rank. Consider the following 'textbook' Gaussian elimination procedure. To simplify the presentation, we assume the underlying field is the unique finite field with two elements, that is, F = GF(2). The generalization of all our protocols to other finite fields of fixed size is straight forward. Consider obliviously running Gaussian elimination on an encrypted k × k matrix M over GF (2) held by Bob. In step (1) Bob faces the problem of choosing the row M j as he cannot distinguish a 0 entry from a 1 entry, and letting Bob (or Alice) learn j may compromise privacy. To go around this problem, we let Alice and Bob eliminate the leftmost column using several rows. For each of the rows they use, if the leftmost entry is 1 then we get the desired elimination. On the other hand, if the leftmost entry is 0, the matrix is not changed at all. We use randomization to guarantee that with high probability, the leftmost entry in at least one of the rows used is 1.
Column Elimination
Protocol Basic Column Elimination securely eliminates the leftmost column of a matrix using its jth row. from Bob to Alice is reduced to O(λk) while the communication from Alice to Bob remains O(λk 2 ). The communication from Alice to Bob will later be reduced as well.
Oblivious Column Elimination. As we noted above, if the leftmost coordinate of the eliminating row M j is 0, running Basic Column Elimination does not advance the elimination process. Protocol Oblivious Column Elimination below uses the upper m rows of M to eliminate the leftmost column. The process is successful if any of these m rows contains 1 in the leftmost coordinate, and the parameter m is chosen such that this happens with high probability. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , m} be the minimal row index such that M [i, 1] is non-zero. Note that (i) the column elimination process using any of the i − 1 upper rows does not change the matrix; (ii) the ith row M i eliminates the leftmost column of M ; (iii) the column elimination process using rows i + 1 to m does not effect M anymore. Denote by M the resulting matrix. Next, Alice and Bob swap the ith and first rows of M . However, as the process is run obliviously, Bob does not know what i is. For that, we slightly modify Gaussian elimination. Note that if the elimination was successful, the ith row in M is the only row that does not have 0 in the leftmost coordinate. Bob adds the top m rows in M into the top row of the matrix:
The result is a leftmost 1 entry in at most two rows of M : the first and ith.
To eliminate the non-zero entry in M we run Basic Column Elimination once more using the top row. If M is a full-rank matrix, and there is a 1 entry in the leftmost column of at least one of the top m rows of M , then in the resulting M satisfies:
Protocol Oblivious Column Elimination We note that Alice and Bob may agree on T by choosing a seed to a pseudorandom generator. Hence, the communication complexity of this protocol is m times that of protocol Basic Column Elimination. It is simple to verify that neither Alice nor Bob gain any information about M . Furthermore, rank(M ) = rank(M ) as M is transformed into M via a sequence of elementary matrix operations. Finally, the following claim shows that the elimination is successful with high probability. The proof appears in Appendix C. 
Oblivious Gaussian Elimination
We now have all the ingredients to present our Oblivious Gaussian Elimination protocol. On a matrix M ∈ GF(2) k×k , the protocol first applies Oblivious Column Elimination, to eliminate the leftmost column, and then recurses on the lower-right (k−1)×(k−1) sub-matrix. For clarity of presentation, we first construct a 'naive' protocol, of communication complexityÕ(λk 3 ) and round complexityÕ(k), and then discuss how to reduce the communication complexity toÕ(λk 2 ) and the round complexity toÕ(k 0.275 ).
Protocol Oblivious Gaussian Elimination (for Square matrices)
INPUT AND OUTPUT: As in Definition 4.1.
Alice and Bob run protocol
Oblivious Column Elimination on M . Let Bob's output be Enc(M ).
Alice and Bob recursively run
Oblivious Gaussian Elimination, on the lower-right (k − 1) × (k − 1) submatrix of M . Let Bob's output be Enc(M ).
Bob locally outputs
As before, it is easy to verify that the parties gain no information about the matrix M . The following claim asserts the correctness of the protocol. The proof appears in Appendix E.
Claim 4.3 At the end of the execution of the Oblivious Gaussian Elimination Protocol, Bob holds an encryption of an upper triangular matrix M as required by Definition 4.1.
Reducing Communication Complexity via Lazy Evaluation
Informally, in the above protocol, Bob uses Alice as a 'calculator' for performing multiplications of encrypted field elements. The communication complexity of protocol Oblivious Gaussian Elimination is O(λmk 3 ) =Õ(λk 3 ), by picking m = polylog(k). We now show that Bob can also use Alice as a storage device, and by this to reduce the communication complexity by a factor of k. Note that in each round of the protocol, Bob sends to Alice one row and one column of Enc(M ), (masked with random vectors). In return, Alice sends O(k) vectors that Bob adds to the matrix M . Each of these vectors is of size k, resulting inÕ(λk 2 ) communication per round.
However, as Bob is not using all the matrix entries in the following round, we can have Alice send him only the single row and column that are needed for completing the next round. We make a simple modification to the protocol, and let Alice maintain a matrix L, where L[i, j] equals the sum of elements Bob needs to add to the entry M [i, j]. Alice would then send Enc(L[i, j]) just before the ith row, or the jth column is needed for Bob. Moreover, whenever Bob multiplies his matrix by a full-rank matrix, Alice needs to multiply L by the same matrix, and this is the reason why Alice and Bob choose the random matrices together. This reduces the communication complexity of each round toÕ(λk), and hence the communication of the entire protocol toÕ(λk 2 ).
Reducing the Round Complexity
The round complexity of our protocol is linear in the matrix dimension, that is Ω(k). In this section we show how to reduce the round complexity to sub-linear while preserving the low communication complexity. The idea is to combine our communication efficient protocol with the general purpose round efficient protocol of Yao [17] . The protocol is still based on Gaussian elimination, only that here we eliminate a number of columns together in the same round. Let = k where 0 < < 1 is a parameter to be specified later. The first modification we make to Oblivious Gaussian Elimination is that Bob multiplies the matrix M by full rank matrices from both sides and not only from the left. By Claim 2.2, if M is a full rank matrix then with constant probability, the top-left × sub-matrix of M , denoted by N , is of full rank as well.
In this stage Alice and Bob execute a secure sub-protocol base on [17] , such that at the end of the protocol Bob holds an encryption of N −1 if N is invertible, and an encryption of the 0 matrix if N is not full rank. Following this stage, the protocol is very similar to the original Oblivious Gaussian Elimination protocol. We divide the k rows of M into k/ blocks of rows each. We now analyze the communication complexity of the secure sub-protocol for computing N −1 . The communication complexity of securely inverting a matrix using Yao's garbled circuit method is related to the circuit complexity of matrix inversion. As matrix inversion is reducible to matrix multiplication, this can be done using a circuit of size O( ω ), where the best known upper bound [6] for ω is approximately 2.38.
Therefore, the communication complexity of the sub-protocol is O(λ ω ). As it is executedÕ(k/ ) times through the protocol we get that the overall complexity of executing the sub-protocol is:
To get a communication complexity ofÕ(λk 2 ), we set the value of such that 1 + ω − = 2, i.e., 2 ) and round complexityÕ(k 0.275 ).
Theorem 4.4 There is a protocol for the Oblivious Gaussian Elimination Problem for Square Matrices (See Definition 4.1) over GF(2) with communication complexityÕ(λk
Handling Non-Square Matrices
Protocol Oblivious Gaussian Elimination as described above works with very high probability for square matrices. We now show how to generalize the protocol to non-square matrices using a reduction. 
Finding a Random Element in The Intersection
As in the previous sections, Alice holds a k a -dimensional subspace V A ⊆F k represented by a k a × k matrix A, while Bob holds holds a k b -dimensional subspace V B ⊆F k represented by B. Alice and Bob wish to securely compute a uniformly distributed random vector in the subspace V A ∩ V B . The main step in the design of our protocol is the addition of random linear constraints to the linear system created by the input subspaces, to reduce the number of solutions into only one random uniformly distributed solution.
We start with a definition of the Oblivious Linear Solve Problem. In Appendix F we show how to modify protocol Oblivious Gaussian Elimination to get protocol Oblivious Linear Solve whose properties are summarizes in the following claim. As in our previous protocols, Alice sends Bob Enc(A), and Bob computes Enc(M ) for M = AB ⊥ . By Claim 3.1, it is enough for Alice and Bob to find a random solution vector x to the linear system xM = 0. However, this linear system may have many solutions and picking an arbitrary solution is not satisfactory for our purpose. Therefore, we add random linear constrains to the linear system. That is, we concatenate a matrix R to M from the left, and a vector u to 0 and solve the linear system x(R|M ) = (u| 0). We want to choose R and u so that with high probability, the system has a unique uniformly distributed solution.
The number of constraints needed to be added to the linear system depends on the dimension of the solution space of xM = 0. To this end, Alice and Bob first execute the Oblivious Gaussian Elimination protocol on M . By Theorem 3.3, with constant probability, the number of non-zero elements on the main diagonal of the result matrix M equals the rank of M . Thus, Alice and Bob add a random linear constraint to R and u for every 0 on the main diagonal of M and a trivial x 0 = 0 constraint for every non-zero element on the diagonal of M . Alice and Bob pick each random constraint by Alice sending the encryption of a random vector to Bob, who adds to it a second random vector. This way neither Alice nor Bob have information regarding the random constraints used. The technical method to add the constraints is depicted in Protocol Random Intersection Vector.
1. Alice generates keys for a homomorphic public key encryption system, and sends Bob Enc(A) and the public key. 4. Bob's computes Enc(x) = j=1 Enc(x j ) and sends Enc(x) to Alice.
Bob locally computes
Alice outputs v = xA.
After adding the random constraints, Alice and Bob run the Oblivious Linear Solve protocol to get an encryption of a solution to the system x(R|M ) = (u| 0). There are three possible cases: (i) The vector (u| 0) is not in the row span of the matrix (R|M ). In this case we get x = 0. (ii) There exists a non-zero vector x such that x(R|M ) = (u| 0), but x is not unique. In this case it holds that xM = 0 but we do not argue that x is a random vector satisfying this requirement. (iii) There exist a unique non-zero vector x such that x(R|M ) = (u| 0). In this case, by a symmetry argument, the vector x is a random vector satisfying xM = 0.
Alice and bob run Linear Equations Solve times and finally use the sum of the vectors x j computed in these executions. The vectors x satisfying xM = 0 form a subspace, and hence are closed for addition. Thus, it is enough for one execution of Linear Equations Solve to yield a random solution, as in case (iii) above. To get to case (iii) we need the Oblivious Gaussian Elimination protocol to succeed and we need the linear system x(R|M ) = (u| 0) to have a unique solution. The first event succeeds with constant probability. The success probability of the second event equals the probability that the sum of two random subspaces V 1 , V 2 ⊆F n of dimensions s and n − s satisfy V 1 ⊕ V 2 = F n . The probability for this event is a constant as well. As both events occur with constant probability, case (iii) occurs with constant probability, and thus it is enough to run Linear Equations Solve ω(log k) times, to get a negligible error probability. 
Intersection of Affine Subspaces
In the affine subspace intersection problem Alice's input is an affine subspace
We design secure protocols for several problems concerning (v a + V A ) ∩ (v b + V B ). Our protocols are based on reductions to problems on linear subspaces. For example, to compute the intersection of two affine subspaces, we need both the Intersection Computation and the Random Intersection Vector protocols on linear subspaces. The following simple claims reduces the problem into computing whether a vector is contained in a subspace. The proofs appear in Appendix G. Hence the probability that T M [i, 1] = 0 for at least one value of i would be 1−neg(k). As a random matrix has full rank with constant probability [4] , it follows that for a random non-singular matrix the probability that such an event occurs is also negligible. 2
Claim 6.1 There exists a vector
v ∈ (v a + V A ) ∩ (v b + V B ) if and only if v a − v b ∈ V A + V B . Claim 6.2 Suppose v a + w a = v b + w b for some w a ∈ V A and w b ∈ V B . Then (v a + V A ) ∩ (v b + V B ) = (v a + w a ) + (V A ∩ V B ). Deciding if (v a + V A ) ∩ (v b + V B )
D Protocol Intersection Decision
Protocol Intersection Decision OUTPUT: If V I is not the trivial zero subspace, Bob outputs Enc(0) with probability 1. Else, with constant probability, Bob outputs Enc(r) for some non-zero r ∈ F .
1. Alice generates keys for a homomorphic public key encryption system, and sends Bob Enc(A) and the public key. 
Bob locally computes
E Correctness of Protocol Oblivious Gaussian Elimination
If M is full-rank then by Claim 4.2 with probability 1 − neg(k) Bob performs a Gaussian elimination on the input matrix exactly like in the original Gaussian elimination procedure. Suppose M is not full rank. If in every execution of Oblivious Column Elimination, there is a 1 entry in the leftmost column of the top m rows, then the procedure is equivalent to Gaussian elimination. As M is not full rank, the Gaussian algorithm cannot lead to a upper triangular matrix with no non-zero entries on the main diagonal. Thus, in some stage of the protocol there must be a column that was not actually eliminated. The diagonal entry in this column is 0.
F Obliviously Solving Sets of Linear Equations
Let Bob hold an encrypted matrix Enc(M ) and an encrypted vector Enc(v). We consider the decisional and functional versions of solving the linear system cM = v (i.e., deciding whether exists a vector c satisfying cM = v, and finding such c).
In the first step of the protocol Bob multiplies M by random operators from the left and from the right to get M = T R M T C . The following simple claim shows that it is enough to check if there exists a vector c such that c M = v to solve the original cM = v system.
